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Abstract 
We outline the drivers, main features, and conceptual underpinnings of the compliance 
paradigm. We then use a similar structure to investigate the drivers, main features, and 
conceptual underpinnings of the cooperative paradigm for working with CSR in global value 
chains. We argue that the measures proposed in the new cooperation paradigm are unlikely to 
alter power relationships in global value chains and bring about sustained improvements in 
workers’ conditions in developing country export industries. After that, we provide a critical 
appraisal of the potential and limits of the cooperative paradigm, we summarize our findings, 
and we outline avenues for research: purchasing practices and labor standard noncompliance, 
CSR capacity building among local suppliers, and improved CSR monitoring by local 
resources in the developing world.  
Key Words: compliance paradigm; cooperative paradigm; corporate social responsibility; 
global value chains. 
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Introduction  
On September 11, 2012, more than 300 workers died in a fire in the Ali garment factory in 
the commercial hub of Karachi, Pakistan. Workers were burned alive, succumbed to smoke 
inhalation, or died after trying to jump from the top floors of the factory building to escape 
the fire. Many of the windows and exit doors had been blocked by factory managers, 
preventing workers from escaping the blaze (Walsh and Greenhouse, 2012). Shortly before 
the fire broke out, the factory complex also had been certified with a SA8000 label—a seal of 
legitimacy for factories that comply with international labor standards (AFL-CIO, 2013). In 
November 2012, another 112 workers died in a factory fire in Dhaka, the capital of 
Bangladesh, when they found themselves trapped on the upper floors of a factory and the fire 
spread from the bottom to the top floors. This factory supplied Wal-Mart and Sears, both of 
which (along with other international retailers) claimed they had not been aware that their 
products were being produced in the Dhaka factory, despite the extensive social and 
environmental auditing programs they had in place for their suppliers (Yardley, 2012). 
Such recent events, including the massive collapse of Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza 
factory in May 2013 that killed more than 1,100 workers, have sparked renewed concerns 
about the lack of national labor regulations and the inadequacy of existing private social 
auditing schemes that seek to ensure a basic level of safety and decent work conditions for 
laborers in export-oriented industries located in developing countries (Locke, 2013). In this 
article, we seek to advance the debate over private social auditing schemes in global value 
chains. We trace the development of social auditing back to the early 1990s, when 
international retailers and supermarkets came under public scrutiny for their sourcing 
practices, after revelations that workers in developing countries were laboring under highly 
exploitative conditions. Private social auditing—also known as the compliance model—
emerged in response to these criticisms. However, during the 2000s and early 2010s, impact 
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assessments of corporate codes of conducts have shown that social auditing schemes (or 
corporate codes of conduct) at best have brought about limited improvements in workers’ 
conditions, especially in developing country export industries. A broad-based coalition of 
leading international retailers, private consultants, academics, and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) thus has started advocating a new cooperative policy paradigm for 
instituting corporate social responsibility (CSR) in global value chains.  
For the purposes of this article we use Blowfield and Frynas’ (2005, p. 503) definition 
of CSR, “an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize the 
following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the natural 
environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of individuals; (b) that 
companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with whom they do business (e.g. 
within supply chains); and (c) that business needs to manage its relationship with wider 
society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add value to society.” 
This article is not the first to review criticisms of compliance-based models (e.g., 
AFL-CIO, 2013; De Neve, 2009; Locke et al., 2007, 2009; Locke and Romis, 2007; Lund-
Thomsen, 2008; Ruwanpura and Wrigley, 2011) but it is the first, to the best of our 
knowledge, to assess critically the potential of and limits to an alternative model, namely, the 
cooperation paradigm for working with CSR in global value chains. We argue that the 
measures proposed by this paradigm are unlikely to alter power relationships in global value 
chains fundamentally. Despite the good intentions of its advocates, it cannot deliver sustained 
improvements in working conditions across developing country export industries, according 
to our analysis. Drawing on a critical review of the cooperation paradigm, we conclude by 
suggesting other avenues for research on CSR in global value chains. 
Compliance-Based Paradigm  
Drivers 
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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, capitalism has dominated economic activity across 
the globe (Khara and Lund-Thomsen, 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s, privatization of state-
owned enterprises, deregulation of national economies, and liberalization of international 
trade combined to create an environment in which it was highly attractive for multinational 
companies to conduct business in developing countries (Utting, 2005). The arrival of new 
communication technologies such as the Internet and the facsimile, reduced costs for 
international air travel, and better transportation infrastructure also made it possible for 
international retailers and supermarkets to source products from countries in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America (Haufler, 2001). These countries promised abundant labor supplies, necessary 
skills and manufacturing capabilities, and much lower wages, such that international buyers 
reduced their cost structures through extensive outsourcing (Tokatli et al., 2008). 
However, the rise of global value chains, through which Western retailers and 
supermarkets controlled vast networks of suppliers dispersed throughout the world, also 
raised substantial concerns about the social and environmental conditions in which the goods 
and services were being manufactured (Seidman, 2007). Campaigns initiated by NGOs, trade 
unions, student organizations, and the media highlighted the use of child and slave labor, as 
well as the existence of sweatshops that produced items destined for Western markets (Klein, 
2000). Initially, the campaigns largely focused on reforming international policy actors, such 
as the World Trade Organization (Locke, 2013). As it became increasingly clear that efforts 
to introduce universal minimum labor and environmental standards would not succeed, due to 
resistance by developing country governments (AFL-CIO, 2013), labor rights and 
environmental activists turned their attention to campaigning against Western retailers and 
supermarkets (Bair and Palpaceur, 2012). These campaigns prompted what we call the 
“compliance-based model” for working with CSR in global value chains (Locke et al., 2009). 
Main Features 
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The compliance-based model assumes that NGOs, trade unions, and the media could bring 
sufficient pressure on international supermarkets and retailers, whether with naming and 
shaming campaigns in the public media or by mobilizing consumer boycotts of corporations 
that failed to ensure safe, hygienic work conditions in their supplier factories in developing 
countries (Locke et al., 2009). Such pressure then should force international companies to 
develop corporate codes of conduct or ethical guidelines, stipulating the social and 
environmental conditions in which their products and services were to be produced in 
developing countries. Compliance with these guidelines could be checked through social and 
environmental audits undertaken by first-, second-, or third-party monitors to confirm 
compliance with international buyers’ codes of conduct (O’Rourke, 2003, 2006). In theory, 
factories that displayed a high level of compliance with a buyer’s code of conduct would be 
rewarded with longer-term trading relationships and more orders. Factories that did not 
attempt to comply with codes of conduct instead would have their orders reduced or even be 
completely excluded from global supply chains (AFL-CIO, 2013). Our emphasis on “in 
theory” is deliberate. In practice, we find limited evidence that international buyers 
systematically cut ties with factories in response to their low social or environmental 
compliance levels. Nor is there evidence to suggest that suppliers that display high levels of 
social and environmental compliance receive rewards in the form of more orders (Ruwanpura 
and Wrigley, 2011).  
This description of the compliance-based model is idealized; in reality, various 
formulations and implementations have emerged across different geographical contexts. As 
Hughes et al. (2007) observe, some companies and multistakeholder initiatives have focused 
less strictly on auditing than others. For example, the U.K.-based ethical trading initiative and 
some of its NGO and company members adopt more aspirational, developmentally oriented 
approaches, with a focus on long-term improvements in labor conditions in global value 
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chains. Multistakeholder initiatives and corporations in the United States instead tend to 
adopt a more short-term, compliance-oriented approach. Nevertheless, in both the United 
States and Europe, widespread agreement admits that the compliance-based model has 
brought about limited improvements in work conditions in developing country export 
industries (AFL-CIO, 2013; Locke, 2013; Locke et al., 2007, 2009; Lund-Thomsen et al., 
2012; Ruwanpura, 2012).  
Throughout the 2000s and into the early 2010s, impact assessment studies showed 
that codes of conduct improved tangible work conditions, such as the payment of minimum 
wages, occupational health and safety, and the reduction of overtime work (Barrientos and 
Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén, forthcoming; ETI, 2006). Although not directly framed as a 
impact assessment study, a recent article by Raj-Reickert (2013) indicates that it may not be 
clear whether measures used in the implementation of corporate codes of conduct (such as 
indicators, benchmarks, and audits) have any effect on the health and safety of workers. 
But codes of conduct had little effect on less tangible issues, such as freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; McIntyre, 
2008; Oxfam, 2013). In some cases, it was unclear whether improvements in work conditions 
resulted from code implementations or other factors, such as a predisposition among supplier 
managers to treat the workforce well, or broader environmental factors, such as changes in 
national legislation (Nelson et al., 2007). Such studies also noted inherent problems with this 
compliance model. First, discrepancies often arose between the commercial practices of 
international buyers (e.g., demand for lower prices, seasonal products, completion of orders 
within a short time span) and their insistence on compliance with their codes of conduct 
(Barrientos, 2013). To meet price points, suppliers could not pay their workers the minimum 
wage; to address seasonal demand, they could not provide stable employment year round; and 
they often were compelled to make workers engage in overtime work to meet last-minute 
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orders (or changes) (Oxfam, 2004; Ruwanpura and Wrigley, 2011; Tokatli et al., 2008). The 
incoherence between international buyers’ purchasing practices and their codes of conduct 
even became institutionalized in their separate purchasing and CSR departments (Harney, 
2008). These distinct departments would visit supplier factories at different times and make 
contradictory demands, such that the purchasing department might require price cuts a week 
before the CSR compliance staff insisted on higher wages for workers in supplier factories 
(Khara and Lund-Thomsen, 2012; Ruwanpura and Wrigley, 2011). 
Second, this lack of consistency across buyers’ purchasing and social auditing 
practices pushed some local suppliers to engage in auditing fraud—a practice that became 
particularly widespread in China (Egels-Zandén, forthcoming; Oxfam, 2013). These suppliers 
trained workers to provide “correct” answers to auditors and used tailored computer programs 
to falsify worker records. Thus they met the commercial requirements of international buyers 
while maintaining the appearance of compliance with corporate codes of conduct (Harney, 
2008). When third-party monitors discovered such auditing fraud, they often lacked sufficient 
incentives to “rock the boat” by demanding significant changes in work conditions, from 
either buyers or suppliers. These monitors usually were commercial auditing firms, so their 
continued business depended on maintaining good relations with either buyers or suppliers—
that is, the clients that paid for the audits to take place. Thus doubts arose regarding whether 
the rarely publicized third-party audits could really generate credible evidence about work 
conditions inside supplier factories (O’Rourke, 2003, 2006). Even more recently, dangerous 
factory conditions that have caused the deaths of hundreds or thousands of garment workers 
raised serious concerns about the validity of social auditing, considering that the Karachi-
based factory and some of the buildings in Rana Plaza had been certified as compliant with 
international standards shortly before the deadly incidents (AFL-CIO, 2013; Clean Clothes 
Campaign/SOMO, 2013).  
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Conceptual Underpinnings 
Many assumptions inherent to the compliance paradigm are reminiscent of those in the global 
value chain framework. For example, Gereffi (1994) proposes that “lead firms,” such as 
European and North American supermarkets and retailers, drive global value chains. Their 
role is to “govern” the global value chain, by determining what kinds of products/services to 
produce, in which quantity, when, where, and at what price, using dispersed networks of 
suppliers across the developing world. According to this perspective, suppliers are generally 
“powerless,” with few or limited options for influencing the governance of the chain by the 
lead firms. Gereffi et al. (2005) add nuance to this view by proposing a theory to explain the 
nature of value chain relationships among international buyers and their first-tier suppliers in 
the developing world. These relationships can range from arm’s-length, market-based 
relationships (buyers have full control over suppliers) to hierarchies (buyers own suppliers). 
In between, modular or relational value chains might be characterized by more equal power 
relationships between buyers and suppliers.  
The compliance-based paradigm similarly assumed that lead firms had the power to 
dictate and control how products were produced by supplier factories in the developing 
world. This assumption further indicated that international supermarkets and retailers could 
control both working and environmental conditions in export-oriented industries. Although 
this compliance-based paradigm avoided the assumption that all lead firms owned their 
suppliers (hierarchy), power relationships in the chain were regarded as highly unequal, with 
first-tier suppliers held “captive” to the social and environmental requirements of buyers.  
Gereffi’s (1994) original conceptualization of global value chain analysis mentions 
the role of institutional contexts, as part of the global value chain framework. However, this 
element remained generally underdeveloped until relatively recently, when authors began 
elaborating on the institutional part of the framework (Nielson and Pritchard, 2009, 2010). In 
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this view, the functioning of global value chains can be understood only in relation to vertical 
and horizontal dimensions. The vertical dimension refers to the question of who determines 
the kinds of products that are to be purchased, when, and at what price in global value chains 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). The horizontal dimension instead entails local socio-economic 
contexts of work and employment affected by global value chains. These local institutional 
contexts include both formal rules of the game, such as economic, social, and environmental 
laws, and the enforcement agencies charged with implementing such laws (De Neve, 
forthcoming).  
Institutions also refer to the informal rules of the game or norms and values that 
various actors hold in relation to what constitutes global value governance (Nielson and 
Pritchard, 2010). For example, there may be sharply contrasting ideas about “local” and 
“global” perceptions of whether child labor should be allowed. International NGOs, trade 
unions, supermarkets, and retailers often insist on prohibitions of child labor; domestic 
producers may take the view that child labor constitutes a form of job training for children 
that will enable them to earn a livelihood, particularly if formal schooling options are either 
nonexistent or of very poor quality (Lund-Thomsen, 2008). As Neilson and Pritchard (2009) 
argue, the interaction of global value chains and local institutional contexts thus creates 
struggles over which norms and values should guide export-oriented production in 
developing countries. 
The compliance-based paradigm focused primarily on vertical relations (i.e., trading 
relationship between international buyers and their suppliers). It has not paid much explicit 
attention to how horizontal relations (i.e., local socio-economic and socio-cultural contexts of 
employment in which global value chains are embedded) affect social and environmental 
compliance levels in developing country export industries. Drawing on Hess (2004), we 
assert that the compliance-based paradigm tends to ignore the societal embeddedness of 
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global value chain participants (i.e., actors’ origins and the influences on their actions without 
or outside of their societies of origin), as well as their territorial embeddedness (i.e., extent to 
which individual actors are anchored in places that facilitate or constrain their actions). 
Instead, the main focus has been on how the value chain could improve social and 
environmental conditions in developing country export industries. Implicitly at least, the 
compliance-based approach seems to have been developed as a response to territorial 
embeddedness. For example, NGOs and trade unions started campaigning against 
international lead firms after they realized that many developing country governments were 
failing to safeguard workers’ rights and control environmental pollution levels (Locke, 2013). 
Thus, they turned to multinational companies to control the social and environmental side 
effects of outsourcing production to suppliers in developing countries (AFL-CIO, 2013). At 
the same time, there was perhaps an implicit recognition of the need to ensure the societal 
embeddedness of corporate codes of conduct. Multinational companies designed codes of 
conduct to ensure that local suppliers abided by their national laws, such as those dictating 
how old a person had to be before she or he could be legally employed in a company. These 
codes of conduct deferred to national laws, even if they also stipulated tougher requirements 
than those ensconced in national laws (Kolk and Van Tulder, 2004).  
Cooperation Paradigm  
Drivers 
In light of these limitations of the compliance-based paradigm, a broad-based coalition of 
actors began pushing for the adoption of what we call a more cooperative policy paradigm to 
working with CSR in global value chains (Lund-Thomsen et al., 2012). First, academic 
researchers have actively cooperated with large multinational companies to research the 
limitations of the compliance-based paradigm and document alternative ways that 
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international brands might cooperate with suppliers to achieve sustained improvements in 
work conditions (Locke, 2013; Locke et al., 2007, 2009; Locke and Romis, 2007).  
Second, multistakeholder initiatives, such as the U.K. Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), 
Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative, Danish Ethical Trade Initiative, and Norwegian 
Sustainable Trade Initiative cooperate across members to find “development-oriented” 
approaches for improving ethical trade (DIEH, 2013). To some extent, their work has been 
informed by results from prior impact studies of codes of conduct (e.g., ETI, 2006). These 
initiatives continue “learning by doing,” developing and trying new approaches through 
projects and working groups, with the aim of establishing best practices for ethical trade. The 
constant search for new and improved methods of improving CSR in global value chains thus 
is compatible with the organizational mandates of these initiatives.  Various NGOs similarly 
have participated in broad-based coalitions of actors, pushing for a more cooperative 
approach to working with CSR in global value chains (IDH, 2010). Oxfam-UK asserts that 
business can serve an important function for poverty reduction in developing countries (Clay, 
2005), so it supports the development of various reports and briefings that document the 
impact of businesses on society but also how companies—and multinationals in particular—
contribute to improving these impacts (Oxfam, 2013). In 2010, Oxfam-UK published a 
briefing, “Better Jobs in Better Supply Chains,” to document how improved labor standards 
in developing country factories might help boost sales and improve staff recruitment and 
retention.  
Third, private-sector consultants have pioneered a new, cooperation-based approach 
to CSR in global value chains. For example, the London-based consultancy IMPACTT 
describes itself as “leading consultancy company in the area of ethical trade, human rights, 
labor rights, and international development” (IMPACTT, 2013). In its 2011 report, it detailed  
how international brands and supermarkets have tried to persuade and instruct suppliers to 
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comply with national labor laws and international labor standards but also why their efforts 
have made little difference for the conditions of workers at the bottom of global value chains. 
This report contains several case studies that highlight ways for international brands, 
suppliers, and workers to identify the “sweet spot” at which their interests intersect. Thus 
international brands and suppliers could compete in “an increasingly uncertain world by 
harnessing the power of the workforces to produce better products more efficiently” 
(IMPACTT, 2011). In short, various actors—including international buyers, academics with 
an interest in CSR in global value chains, consultancy companies, and NGOs—have pushed 
for the adoption of a new paradigm to working with CSR in global value chains. 
Main Features 
In a somewhat stylized fashion, we can identify the main characteristics of the new 
cooperative paradigm to working with CSR in global value chains. First, international buyers 
need to review their purchasing practices and provide better prices to their suppliers so that 
the latter can afford to pay workers higher wages. These buyers also might introduce better 
production planning, to provide business to suppliers throughout the year and avoid last-
minute orders (Barrientos, 2013). Maintaining long-term trading relationships with suppliers, 
instead of shopping around for the cheapest deal, thus becomes crucial for securing better 
work conditions at the bottom of global value chains (Oxfam, 2010). In addition, 
coordination between purchasing and CSR departments could enhance the consistency of the 
demands that these buyers place on suppliers (IDH, 2009). 
Second, instead of expecting suppliers to shoulder all of the costs of compliance with 
codes of conduct, buyers might invest in capacity development, for both local supplier 
managers and workers employed in the factories (Oxfam, 2010). Local factory managers 
should receive training in human resources management, product quality, and production 
processes. Instead of seeing workers as a costly input factor, local factory managers need to 
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be trained to understand them as an important company resource (Nike, 2010). Improving 
worker–management relations also could help reduce the high turnover rates at supplier 
factories (IMPACTT, 2011). By involving workers more actively in decision-making 
processes while promoting teamwork and fault-finding on factory floors, such tactics could 
increase productivity (Locke et al., 2009). Moreover, some recommendations include offering 
workers training in their basic rights and responsibilities in the workplace. Then traditional 
code implementation and auditing could provide top-down pressures on manufacturers to 
improve conditions, while workers aware of their rights apply a simultaneous bottom-up 
pressure to receive safe working conditions (Lund-Thomsen and Coe, 2013). However, a 
prerequisite for these initiatives was closer cooperation and frequent interactions between the 
sourcing and CSR personnel of international brands and local factory management. Without 
such interactions, it would not be possible to secure the simultaneous objectives of enhancing 
factory competitiveness and work conditions (Locke and Romis, 2007). 
Third, considering the poor track record of mainstream social auditing methods, a new 
range of policy measures has aimed to transform standard-setting and auditing in global value 
chains. With participatory social auditing, auditors would need to be knowledgeable of the 
local contexts and able communicate in the native languages of workers (Auret and 
Barrientos, 2005). These auditors then could move beyond a tick-box approach and short fly 
in–fly out visits, which rarely revealed fundamental violations. Instead, they would have 
opportunities to be creative, such as leaving their own contact information with workers, who 
then could call after the visit if they wanted to convey something outside the usual working 
hours (Harney, 2008). Some companies started experimenting with off-site visits to interview 
workers in their homes, where they might feel less pressured to provide particular answers to 
an auditor’s questions. Moreover, cooperation between corporations  and local resources, 
such as NGOs and trade unions, would enable closer, more independent, year-round 
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monitoring of work conditions (Oxfam, 2010). Working with such local resources provided a 
means to discover unauthorized outsourcing of production to local subcontractors, which 
otherwise would be difficult to discover through normal snapshot audits. 
Conceptual Underpinnings 
In conceptual terms, the shift to the cooperation-based paradigm marks a change in the nature 
of value chain governance between international buyers and first-tier suppliers. With its 
emphasis on long-term, trust-based relationships and close collaboration between 
international buyers and suppliers, this paradigm mirrors relational value chains, which are 
characterized by high degrees of mutual dependency in the design, production, and marketing 
of products/services between buyers and suppliers. Similarly, the cooperation paradigm 
envisages close collaboration by buyers and first-tier suppliers related to issues such as the 
introduction of new production techniques or the reorganization of work processes on the 
factory floor. 
The original global value chain approach considered how local suppliers could 
improve their position in global value chains, with the aim of extracting greater financial 
benefits from their participation in the global economy (Schmitz, 1999, 2006). The global 
value chain approach assumed local suppliers could learn from their interactions with global 
buyers, such as how to improve their products (product upgrading) and production processes 
(process upgrading). In addition, by learning production skills during interactions with global 
buyers in one industry, suppliers might transfer these skills and become more competitive in 
other industries (intersectoral upgrading) (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Schmitz and Nadvi, 
1999).  
Yet for suppliers to move up the value chain, they also would have to adopt higher-
level functions, such as designing and branding their own products (functional upgrading). A 
consensus emerged that lead firms likely would bar suppliers’ functional upgrading, because 
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this step would encroach on their own core competence and turn the suppliers into 
competitors or new lead firms (Schmitz, 2006). The compliance-based paradigm basically 
ignored the potential benefits that developing country suppliers might obtain from engaging 
in social and environmental upgrades to their factories. Instead, they became the “culprits” 
who failed to address social and environmental concerns, whereas more powerful, 
international buyers would develop codes of conduct and enforce them rigorously.  
In contrast, the cooperation-based paradigm places more emphasis on creating 
opportunities for product and process upgrading. It emphasizes the business case for social 
compliance, such that building suppliers’ human resources management and production 
organization capabilities enhance worker productivity and ensure consistent manufacturing of 
high quality products (IMPACTT, 2011). Such cooperation also implies a commitment to 
social upgrading, including increasing the quality and conditions of work by training of 
workers about their legal rights and the relevant codes of conduct (Lund-Thomsen and 
Coe,2013). This stylized account of the cooperation paradigm does not place much emphasis 
on local institutional contexts, particularly the territorial embeddedness of global value 
chains, but some early signs suggest that this issue is gaining in importance. For example, the 
ETI (2012) recently announced that its future work would focus on a limited number of value 
chains (food and farming, hard goods and household, and apparel/textiles), instead of 
concentrating on thematic issues such as child labor or homework per se (though work 
continues on these issues). Therefore, the ETI can concentrate on mapping workers’ rights 
violations in specific value chains that entail distinct societal contexts (e.g., southern India). 
According to this initiative (ETI, 2012, p. 3), “Addressing workers’ issues in the context in 
which they occur will enable us to develop models for wider change that are rooted in 
reality.”  
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This new approach seems to fit well with insights gained in research highlighting the 
importance of a good understanding of how CSR becomes embedded in national institutional 
contexts, in both developed and developing countries (Jamali and Neville, 2011; Matten and 
Moon, 2008). Institutional perspectives on CSR focus on explaining how and why CSR 
differs across national or institutional contexts (Brammer et al., 2012; Gond et al., 2011), as 
well as the potential role of CSR as a global homogenizing force. In this sense, Western 
conceptions of CSR might spread across the globe as various organizations (and private 
companies in particular) seek to achieve legitimacy with external stakeholders and respond to 
mimetic, coercive, and normative pressures (Jamali and Neville, 2011). This search for 
legitimacy informs the new cooperation-based paradigm, with its focus on international 
buyers cooperating with local resources, such as NGOs and trade unions that theoretically can 
provide independent, year-round monitoring of work and environmental conditions at local 
supplier factory sites. These local resources should provide insights into local work 
conditions at the bottom of global value chains. From this perspective, the cooperation-based 
paradigm encompasses a global production networks approach (Henderson et al., 2002).In the 
global production networks approach, the starting point is the network metaphor, which 
appears better able to capture global economic organizations than a chain metaphor (Coe et 
al., 2008).  
In practice, lead firms cannot govern their value chains completely. Instead, the 
governance of global production networks is “spread out,” and diverse actors, such as 
international organizations, national governments, NGOs, trade unions, business associations, 
workers, and communities, help determine which products to produce, when, where, in what 
quantities, and at what price (Henderson et al., 2002). The emphasis in the global production 
networks approach includes all relevant actors in the production network, not just the direct 
relationship between international buyers and first-tier suppliers, to understand how such 
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networks are governed (Coe et al., 2004). This line of thinking is reflected in the cooperation-
based paradigm, in which the effective monitoring of work and environmental conditions at 
supplier factories cannot be limited to lead firms and suppliers. A wider set of actors is 
necessary to govern the value chain effectively, including local, place-based NGOs and trade 
unions with the necessary expertise to assist lead firms in monitoring work conditions in 
export-oriented industries in developing countries.  
The New Cooperation Paradigm: A Critical Assessment 
Can this new paradigm for CSR in global value chains deliver sustained improvements in 
workers’ conditions, as its many advocates hope and believe? We briefly examine some of 
the main tensions that exist for the new paradigm.  
First, just how widespread is the new cooperation-based paradigm for working with 
CSR in global value chains? In other words, is this new paradigm being taken up by 
international retailers and supermarkets, or is it mostly an ideal, preached rather than 
practiced in global value chains? Despite the dearth of research into the actual practices of the 
new cooperation paradigm, there are several reasons to question just how widespread it is at 
the moment. Locke and colleagues (2009) document the cooperation between Nike and some 
of its suppliers in Central America and Asia, which brought about improvements in workers’ 
conditions. Barrientos (2013) and Lund-Thomsen and Coe (2013) also detail how 
international brands, NGOs, and trade unions have sought to collaborate on issues such as 
improving purchasing practices and year-round capacity building. However, Barrientos 
(2013) also notes that international buyers resist the adoption of responsible practices, and 
Lund-Thomsen and Coe (2013) describe how the global financial crisis and stakeholder 
politics partly undermined Nike’s attempts to link better supplier incentives, factory 
management training, and awareness-raising activities among the workers employed at a 
Pakistani supplier. These important examples suggest how the new cooperation paradigm 
20 
 
may work in practice, but we find little evidence to suggest that international brands have 
fundamentally revised their purchasing practices, engaged in long-term capacity building 
with suppliers, or cooperated with local NGOs and trade unions to train workers and 
undertake constant factory monitoring. Both Barrientos (2013) and Lund-Thomsen and Coe 
(2013) instead offer examples of how the measures advocated by the cooperation paradigm 
might fail. Moreover, Locke et al.’s (2009) examples do not necessarily reflect the general 
approach Nike takes to working with its suppliers. The rhetoric surrounding cooperation 
sounds valid, but it is difficult to imagine how vast corporations such as Nike can realistically 
engage in close cooperation with more than 800 first-tier suppliers. Collaboration might be 
feasible with a few selected suppliers, engaged in pilot projects; it appears nearly impossible 
to replicate such close cooperation across hundreds of suppliers, considering just the 
logistical challenges. Instead, traditional forms of compliance monitoring likely will continue 
to offer the dominant approach to working with CSR in global value chains, supplemented 
with occasional pilot projects that seek to develop functional alternatives.  
Second, the cooperation-based paradigm emphasizes long-term relationships and 
investments in capacity building, but few “Southern” voices have taken part in defining this 
new paradigm. Rather, it appears advocated mainly by international brands, Northern-based 
consultants, academics, and NGOs. The voices of developing country suppliers, workers, and 
communities have remained largely silent. This is hardly a new critique of CSR approaches 
that originate in Europe and North America (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Prieto-Carron et 
al., 2006), but the absence of Southern voices in advocating this change to working with CSR 
in global value chains can reinforce existing inequalities in global value chain governance. 
The new cooperation paradigm thus appears to do little to change the basic status quo, in 
which only certain actors (i.e., international retailers) dictate the terms of their trade with 
local suppliers. From this perspective, the cooperation paradigm can do little to alter 
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suppliers’ perceptions that CSR in global value chains is a form of economic and cultural 
imperialism (Khan and Lund-Thomsen, 2011). In economic terms, some actors demand that 
workers be hired as permanent, full-time employees and paid compensation after layoffs, but 
if they cannot guarantee sufficient work throughout the year—or at least not in the same 
quantity—it becomes financially impossible for local suppliers to keep a permanent 
workforce employed at factories (Lund-Thomsen, 2008). These same corporations often 
insist that local suppliers pay the costs associated with upgrading factories; that is, they 
demand improvements but are not willing to share the costs of achieving them (Ruwanpura 
and Wrigley, 2011). In cultural terms, the norms and values underlying CSR rhetoric often 
represent impositions on developing country suppliers that operate in diverse contexts 
(Nadvi, 2008), distinct from those that determine the norms of Western Europe or North 
America. For example, whereas child labor is a social evil in Western views of the world, it 
offers a means of informal education and family support in some areas of South Asia (A. 
Khan 2007). This “education” not only helps support the family but also enables children to 
learn a profession that will sustain them later in life. In contexts characterized by desperate 
poverty and unavailable schooling, child labor may be part of broader livelihood strategies, 
used to stay alive (F.R. Khan, 2007; Ruwanpura and Roncolata, 2006).  
Another question pertains to whether the cooperation-based approach even is feasible 
in the context of wider capitalist competition. For example, international consumers 
seemingly dictate the price and quality requirements for particular goods and services 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). International corporations respond to these consumer demands by 
designing products with matching price and quality ranges. Then they place orders reflecting 
the quantity, quality, and price ranges demanded by consumers, across vast networks of 
suppliers in developing countries that engage in fierce competition to attract and sustain this 
business (Gereffi, 1994). In response to supply chain pressures, local suppliers structure 
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networks of contractors, contractors, and workers to obtain the required inputs at the lowest 
possible price. In this competitive context, there is very little scope for cooperation, beyond 
the limits set by international consumer markets that demand simultaneously constant price 
decreases, shorter lead times, and maintenance of product quality (Khara and Lund-Thomsen, 
2012; Tokatli et al., 2008). Even were improved cooperation between buyers and suppliers to 
arise, nothing in the new paradigm ensures a revised sharing of the benefits across the value 
chain participants. As Kaplinsky (2000) illustrates, securing effective returns on value chain 
participation depends on the kinds of rents that value chain participants can obtain. Economic 
rents may be attained through differential productivity (among enterprises or workers) and 
the erection of barriers to entry (Kaplinsky, 2005). To the extent that international buyers still 
command the most rents in the value chain, through their control of the design, branding, 
market, and distribution of consumer products and services, shifting to a cooperation 
paradigm is unlikely to increase supplier incomes substantially enough to sustain 
improvements in work conditions and living standards. That is, the cooperation paradigm 
does not fundamentally challenge the inequality inherent in global value chains. Drawing on 
Lund-Thomsen (2008), if a local worker is paid 60 cents for stitching a football in Pakistan, 
the management of the local supplier might be paid 5 dollars for selling that ball to an 
international brand, before it is sold in an outlet store in Europe or North America at a price 
of US$100. In other words, international retailers continue to capture most of the value from 
global value chain participation; suppliers and workers in developing countries obtain 
marginal shares of the overall value generated. Nor does the new paradigm do anything to 
alter the basic system of “sweating” (Miller, 2012). Garment manufacturing had already 
taken on a pyramid shape in the early twentieth century in the United States and Germany: At 
the top sat so-called “jobbers” that had developed their own designs (and sometimes 
manufacturing capabilities). They increasingly used production mediators (“sweaters”) that 
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could “extract[] the most labour … at the lowest possible price from manufacturing units with 
the most vulnerable workers that could be found” (Miller, 2012, p. 1). In reference to 
Blackburn (2007), Miller argues that this system works in contexts marked by an oversupply 
of labor and no union organization, varying or seasonal demand, and a lack of proper 
management. The discourse in the cooperation paradigm aims to address root causes of poor 
working conditions at the bottom of global value chains, but it does little, if anything, to 
change the pyramid-shaped, unequal, exploitative (global) production system. Perhaps the 
strongest critique of the cooperation paradigm is that it fails to grant workers sufficient 
agency in governing the global value chains. An emerging body of literature notes local 
workers in export-oriented industries who prefer not to work in CSR-compliant factories (De 
Neve, 2009; Lund-Thomsen, 2013). The main point is to show the diversity of lived 
experiences among workers engaged in export-oriented manufacturing, particularly in South 
Asia. Workers are not a uniform input factor; they are living, sentient beings with great 
diversity in their sex, age, family, economic, cultural, and caste backgrounds. Such diversity 
influences their preferences to opt into or out of different work practices and places. Carswell 
and De Neve (2013) demonstrate that young, unmarried, female migrant workers appear 
content working in formalized, export-oriented factories in Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu, India, 
because this type of work helps them maximize their earnings and savings, which will help 
them later in their lives. Once these workers marry, they often are expected to adopt primary 
child rearing and domestic household responsibilities, such that full-time factory-based work 
in the city may no longer be feasible for them. Instead, home-based work likely offers a more 
appealing option, enabling them to earn some income, even if relatively meager, while 
balancing their domestic duties with income-generating means (see also Lund-Thomsen, 
2013).  
Conclusions 
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With this article, we have argued that leading retailers, consultants, NGOs, and academics 
recognize the limitations of traditional compliance-based models of working with CSR in 
global value chains. With this model, international NGOs, trade unions, student 
organizations, and the media pressured multinational companies to adopt voluntary social and 
environmental guidelines for the performance of their supplier factories in developing 
countries. In theory (but rarely in practice), this approach would reward CSR-compliant 
factories and punish those that did not comply. In practice, the compliance model induced 
relatively modest improvements in work conditions for laborers in export-oriented industries 
in developing countries. Therefore, a coalition of academics, consultants, leading retailers, 
and NGOs has advocated a new, cooperation-based paradigm to rectify the shortcomings of 
the compliance-based paradigm. In the new paradigm, international buyers revise their 
purchasing practices, help build the capacity of local factory management and workers, and 
cooperate with local resources (e.g., NGOs, trade unions) to improve factory monitoring and 
thus labor standard compliance.  
By critically assessing the potential and limitations of this new paradigm, we argue 
that it is unlikely to alter the power relations of international buyers, suppliers, and workers in 
global value chains. In particular, the new paradigm seems unable to secure significantly 
higher incomes or improved conditions for workers, considering the constraints imposed by 
worldwide competition among suppliers. International markets instead appear likely to 
remain volatile, ever-changing, and demanding, such that suppliers realistically cannot 
undertake significant upgrades in the conditions of employment for workers without the 
threat that corporations will relocate their production to other capable, cheaper (and less 
compliant) suppliers elsewhere in the developing world. Furthermore, the verdict is still out, 
regarding whether this cooperative paradigm will receive wider recognition and uptake 
among international brands. Several themes could guide important investigations into the 
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effects of this new paradigm, including (a) the link between buyer purchasing practices and 
labor standard (non)compliance in developing country factories, (b) efforts to develop the 
capacity of local supplier management in the area of human resources management, and (c) 
cooperation between international buyers and local resources.  
Purchasing Practices and Labor Standard Noncompliance 
Multiple NGO reports and academic articles have pointed to the potentially adverse 
consequences of corporate purchasing practices on labor standard compliance in developing 
country factories (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Oxfam, 2004; Traidcraft, 2006), yet the topic 
lacks sufficient insights from CSR research in global value chains (cf. Barrientos, 2013). 
Further investigations of the new CSR paradigm should fill this gap by linking the hitherto 
unconnected literature streams related to supply chain/operations management and labor 
standards/codes of conduct in global value chains. In the former, the focus has been mainly 
on how to optimize processes for sourcing products from domestic or overseas suppliers and 
pay the lowest possible price for the best possible product, delivered in the shortest possible 
time frame. Labor research in global value chains instead has addressed how workers (a) 
benefit from participation in global value chains, (b) are affected by corporations’ ethical 
guidelines and economic upgrading or downgrading processes by local supplier firms, and (c) 
actively exert their agency to influence their work conditions (Barrientos et al., 2011; Nadvi, 
2004; Riisgaard, 2009; Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011). Investigations of the effects of the new 
cooperative paradigm on CSR in global value chains thus could help build a bridge between 
operations and supply chain management studies and research into labor standards in global 
value chains by theorizing and empirically investigating how corporate purchasing practices 
affect labor standard compliance levels, whether positively or negatively, in developing 
country export industries.  
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Another research focus could detail the performance systems in which purchasing 
managers operate, to determine how different policies reward and/or punish decision making 
that integrates economic, social, and environmental criteria in purchasing practices. Such 
investigations would require more in-depth analyses or interviews with purchasing managers 
and personnel regarding pricing, lead times, product quality, the use of particular production 
technologies, and management systems. An important theme in this direction might consider 
how purchasing managers deal with the multiple sustainability dilemmas they face when 
executing purchasing/sourcing/CSR activities. Researchers would need to ask when and why 
“classical” purchasing practices seem compatible or conflict with social and environmental 
sustainability criteria. Research attention also might address resolutions to the sustainability 
dilemma, including the strategies that purchasing managers already employ when they face 
multiple requirements. For example, what decision-making processes do managers adopt 
when they must choose between responding to price pressures by buyers or devoting 
resources to improving their social/environmental performance? On the other side, how do 
buyers decide whether to shop around for the cheapest possible bargain or else engage in 
long-term cooperation with their suppliers? 
CSR Capacity Building Among Local Suppliers 
Research into the effects of the new cooperative paradigm on CSR should investigate 
whether pilot projects that have attempted to improve human resources management capacity 
at local supplier factories have been successful. The new cooperation paradigm predicts that 
improved human resources management leads to greater labor standard compliance 
(IMPACTT, 2011). Theoretically, this assumption is reminiscent of Grimshaw and Rubery’s 
(2005) mutual gains approach, according to which the formal employment relationship 
provides guarantees to workers (e.g., formal contracts, limits to overtime work, health 
insurance), in return for workers’ cooperation, such that both parties gain. That is, employers 
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gain access to a skilled and committed workforce, turnover declines, and productivity 
increases, while workers enjoy stable work, income, and productive employment. 
Empirically, the question is whether such an approach is feasible or realistic in competitive 
international environments marked by declining piece rates, shorter lead times, increasing 
quality demands, and demands for buyers and suppliers to maintain flexibility to respond 
quickly to changing market needs (Tokatli et al., 2008).  
We thus call for studies that empirically investigate whether attempts at building 
suppliers’ capacity, such as in human resources management, really improve relations 
between management and workers, despite the broader competitive pressures that global 
value chain participation entails. Research attention also should consider how power 
relationships in the value chain affect possibilities for sustaining upgrades. For example, there 
may be differences in the ways large retailers and small or medium-sized importers engage in 
capacity building. For large retailers with hundreds or thousands of suppliers, long-term 
capacity building measures may be infeasible beyond a few select suppliers, chosen 
specifically for this benefit. Smaller importers with fewer suppliers instead may be better 
positioned to engage in long-term cooperation, such that a mutual gains approach could be 
more applicable. If small and medium-sized importers depend on single suppliers in 
relational chains, their incentives to invest in long-term CSR upgrading efforts at local 
factories in the developing world likely are greater. 
Improved CSR Monitoring by Local Resources 
The third part of a research agenda related to the new cooperation paradigm should consider 
the use of local resources that act as the eyes and ears of international retailers and 
supermarkets on the ground, offering year-round monitoring of work conditions in supplier 
factories (Oxfam, 2010). Similar to the issue with capacity building, this theme has important 
implications for power relations. According to the cooperation paradigm, local resources 
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might extend the power of international retailers and supermarkets to control social and 
environmental conditions in supplier factories—but at a price. For example, local NGOs risk 
becoming financially dependent on international corporations, creating questions about their 
ability to assess work conditions independently (Baur and Schmitz, 2012). Such cooperation 
with international firms also creates the risk that the more radical advocacy agendas of NGOs 
might get toned down, in favor of maintaining cooperative relationships (Newell, 2001).  
Similarly, local trade unions would confront challenges were they to engage in year-
round monitoring of work conditions in local export industries. Traditionally, unions have 
cited freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as the most important labor 
rights and the best means to facilitate improved working conditions in factory-based work 
settings. Without the right to organize collectively and negotiate for improved work 
conditions, real changes in compliance with labor standards may be unlikely (AFL-CIO, 
2013). From this point of view, serving as a local resource that monitors work conditions at 
local supplier factories for international corporations might dilute the very raison d’etre of 
trade unions. Instead of taking a seat at the table and engaging in collective bargaining, 
unions might suddenly find themselves part of the private regulatory efforts of Western 
companies, whose standards have been determined unilaterally. Further investigations of the 
new cooperation paradigm for CSR in global value chains thus should attend carefully to both 
the possibilities and the challenges that such forms of cooperation present, not only for 
international firms but also for the freedom and independence of local NGOs and trade 
unions.  
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